Bonghanoy v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 231490 & 231566, September 15, 2021

INTING, J.:

Doctrine:

It is settled that the Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's finding and call on the existence of a probable cause. This rule of non-interference is, however, far from absolute. Case law has it that the Court will intervene upon proof of commission of grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman.

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Ubay, Bohol passed and approved Resolution No. 205, Series of 2013, requesting the Municipal Mayor to allow the Sangguniang Bayan to hold 3-win cockfights on February I and 2, 2014 at the Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Gymnasium. The resolution was attested to by Vice Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan Presiding Officer Nelson L. Uy and approved by then Municipal Mayor Galicano E. Atup.

Then Mayor Atup issued a special permit for the holding of the cockfighting on the date and venue requested, subject to the conditions that the regulatory fees shall be complied with and that the municipal ordinances and existing laws governing cockfights shall be strictly followed.  

The 3-win cockfighting event was subsequently held.

On April 10, 2014, private complainant Cesar C. Arro, Sr. filed before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas in Cebu City a Complaint-Affidavit  for violation of PD 449 against the following public officials, to wit: then Mayor Atup, then Vice Mayor Uy, Councilors Efren S. Tanjay, Victor A. Bonghanoy (collectively, petitioners barangay officials).

Petitioners were alleged to have authorized and/or caused the holding of a 3-win cockfighting event on January 28, 29, and 30, 2014 at Union Cultural Sports Center, which is an unlicensed cockpit.

Petitioners, in their respective petitions, argued that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for the filing of Information for violation of PD 449 against them; and that the applicable provision of law is not Section 5(d) but Section 5(e) of PD 449, which allows the holding of cockfighting for the entertainment of balikbayans in places other than a licensed cockpit; hence, there is no probable cause for their indictment.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding the existence of probable cause for the filing of Information against petitioners for violation of PD 449

Ruling: Yes. 

The Court finds that petitioners' case falls under Section 5(e) of PD 449 for the following reasons:

First, the Sangguniang Bayan of Ubay, Bohol, passed Resolution No. 205, Series of 201 3, requesting the Mayor to allow the holding of 3-win cockfights for the entertainment of balikbayans and local tourists.

Second, the Sangguniang Bayan asked for a special permit from the Provincial Director for the holding of the cockfights. Notably, the Ombudsman admitted that a special permit from the PNP is not necessary when the cockfighting event is to be done on the occasion of a local town fiesta but only when the cockfighting is primarily intended to entertain tourists and/or balikbayans. Considering that the main purpose in holding the cockfighting was to entertain tourists and balikbayans, the Sangguniang Bayan found it necessary to secure a Special Permit from the Provincial Director of the PNP. In fact, the Special Permit issued by the Provincial Director proved the reason for the holding of the cockfighting.

As the cockfighting is to be held for the purpose stated in the special permit, i.e., to entertain tourists and balikbayans, the Provincial Director made it clear that he can no longer issue another permit for that purpose in the same year which is in compliance with Section 5(e) of PD 449. As may be recalled, Section 5(e) provides that the privilege of holding such cockfighting "within the month of a local fiesta," which is otherwise prohibited under Section 5(d), shall be extended for only one time within a year.

Third, Section 5(e) allows cockfighting for the entertainment of tourists or balikbayans to be held in licensed cockpits or in playgrounds or parks.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 5(d) of PD 449, as amended

People v. Dionisio y Cruz, G.R. No. L-25513, March 27, 1968

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Doctrine:

The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute, is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."

Facts:

ROSAURO DIONISIO, appellant herein, was charged with having violated Republic Act No. 3063 before the Court of First Instance of Manila in an information filed by the Assistant City Fiscal in this wise:

          That on or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, a person who is not duly authorized in any capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a horse race, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully offer, arrange and collect bets for the Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati, Rizal, and for that purpose has in possession the following, to wit: cash money in the amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing Program, dated Aug. 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double receipt.

          On being arraigned, accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.

However, when the case was finally called for trial, accused voluntarily waive his right to be assisted by counsel, withdrew his former plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty to the information charging him with violation of Rep. Act No. 3063

  Violation of the Act is sanctioned by "a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not less than one month or more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the Court." (R. A. 954, Sec. 1, as amended by R. A. 3063, sec. 2).

Issue: Whether the penalty as applied to his offense infringes the constitutional provision

Ruling: No.

  To bolster his position, appellant argues that the provided penalty is harsh, the true measure of the gravity of any offense being its effects, if unchecked, upon the well-being of the people and the body politic. The premise can be granted, without the conclusion being true or correct.

    Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the constitutional stricture has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhuman and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience (Weems vs. U.S., 217 U. S. 349) and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category.

Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

What evils should be corrected as pernicious to the body politic, and how correction should be done, is a matter primarily addressed to the discretion of the legislative department, not of the courts; and the view that unsupervised gambling is definitely detrimental to the nation and its citizens counts with respectable support. "The hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman, and habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." (Planiol, Droit Civil, Vol. 2, No. 2110). "The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." (Peo. vs. Gorostiza, 77 Phil. 88)

RODOLFO B. BAYGAR, Sr. v. Judge LILIAN D. PANONTONGAN A.M. NO. MTJ-08-1699 : March 17, 2009

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Doctrine:

The Court cannot overemphasize that the conduct required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to free them from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

Facts:

Complainant and a certain Arsenio Larga (Larga) were apprehended for violation of Presidential Decree No. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974), in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1602 (Prescribing Stiffer Penalties on Illegal Gambling), by three policemen, namely, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Arnel Anore, Police Officer (PO) Oligario Salvador, and Ian Gatchalian Voluntad. The criminal complaint against complainant was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-0843 and raffled to MTC, Branch 1 of Binangonan, Rizal.

Complainant and Larga were brought to the Police Precinct of Binangonan, Rizal, for detention. Larga was released in the morning of 12 August 2002 allegedly after payment of bail in the aggregate amount of ₱2,300.00 to PO Reynaldo Gonzaga.1 Complainant was released only in the afternoon of the same day after his wife Wilfreda Baygar (Wilfreda), upon the instructions of PO Joaquin Arcilla (Arcilla), paid ₱3,020.002 to respondent Process Server Tiraña.

It so happened that in the afternoon of the same day, 12 August 2002, respondent Judge Panontongan already promulgated her Decision.

Following his release from police custody, complainant filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for arbitrary detention and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, against five police officers; Atty. Fernando B. Mendoza, a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO); and respondents Judge Panontongan and Process Server Tiraña of the MTC.

Complainant also filed a final complaint against Presiding Judge Lilian G. Dinulos-Panontongan for illegal, improper and unethical conduct.

Issue: Whether the respondents orchestrated and made it appear that he pleaded guilty to a crime for which he was detained, during the simulated arraignment in the sala of Judge Panontongan, when in truth and in fact he did not attend any proceeding.

Ruling: Yes. After an examination of the records, the Court affirms the findings and conclusions of the OCA but modifies the recommended penalties.

A public office is a public trust, public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. Indeed, the image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct even of minor employees; thus, they must preserve the judiciary’s good name and standing as a true temple of justice. This Court has often reminded its personnel of the high norm of public service.

Respondent Process Server Tiraña clearly failed to observe the standard of conduct and behavior required of an employee in the judiciary, and he cannot avoid responsibility for his acts. However, the Court finds the recommendation of dismissal by the OCA to be too harsh, it appearing that this is respondent Process Server Tiraña’s first offense in his 21 years in government service. Suspension for one year without pay is already sufficient penalty given the circumstances.

As for the respondent Judge, the Court pronounced that, nonetheless, judges must not only be fully cognizant of the state of their dockets; likewise, they must keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their immediate supervision who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice. The leniency of a judge in the administrative supervision of his employees is an undesirable trait. It is therefore necessary that judges should exercise close supervision over court personnel.31 Respondent Judge Panontongan must therefore be warned to be more circumspect in her supervision of court personnel, such as respondent Process Server Tiraña.

GEORGIA ADLAWAN v. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch XIII, Cebu City G.R. No. 73022. February 9, 1989.

REGALADO, J.:

Doctrine:

Presidential Decree No. 449 specifically states in Section 5 thereof that:" (c) Cockpits Site and Construction. — Cockpits shall be constructed and operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in the Zoning Law or Ordinance. In the absence of such law or ordinance, the local executives shall see to it that no cockpits are constructed within or near existing residential or commercial areas, hospitals, school buildings, churches, or other public buildings. . .." 

Facts:

With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which provided for the "one cockpit for every municipality" rule, the present controversy arose.

The findings of respondent trial court establish the Office of the Mayor of Minglanilla, Cebu, received a radio message from the Cebu Provincial Command of the Philippine Constabulary laying down the policy governing cockpits, the pertinent provisions of which state that: (1) only licensed municipal cockpits shall be allowed to operate in every municipality; (2) barrio cockpits, even if licensed shall not be allowed to operate; (3) if there is no municipal cockpit, a barrio cockpit may be allowed or considered a municipal cockpit when the mayor certifies to that effect; and (4) in no case shall the operation of more than one cockpit be allowed in every municipality. 

With the receipt of the aforesaid message, the question arose as to which cockpit shall remain to operate and which shall be closed, the final determination whereof was held in abeyance, with the municipal council of Minglanilla instead referring the matter to the Philippine Constabulary unit which had jurisdiction over the same. Thereafter, the Provincial Command rendered a decision, upholding the Coliseum, private respondents’ cockpit, as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla, Cebu. The then operator of the barrio cockpit Bag-Ong Bulangan, or Gallera as previously indicated, appealed the decision to the Zone Commander who in turn referred the matter back to said municipal council.

Thereafter, the Committee on Laws and Ordinances of the Municipal Council of Minglanilla submitted a report on the cockpit controversy, which was adopted  and later approved by the Municipal Council recommending the retention and certification of the Bag-Ong Bulangan, or the Gallera, as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla. 

Issue: 

Whether the decision of respondent trial court is illegal for having been rendered with obvious disregard of existing laws and is, therefore, null and void.

Ruling: 

No. It is clear from the statutory provision that it is discretionary upon the municipal council to fix the location of cockpits in their jurisdiction and determine the allowable distance thereof from public buildings, thru the passage of a municipal ordinance. Republic Act No. 1224, however, specifically prohibits the retroactive application of any such municipal ordinance to cockpits already existing at the time of its enactment, specifically with respect to the fixing of distances at which said cockpits may be established.

In accordance therewith and as hereinbefore stated, the Municipal Council of Minglanilla passed Ordinance No. 4 on February 9, 1969 which provided that municipal cockpits must be at least 50 lineal meters away from public buildings.

ONE HEART SPORTING CLUB, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE DIPOLOG COLISEUM, INC. G.R. No. L-53790 October 23, 1981

DE CASTRO,  J.:

Doctrine:

The question being purely legal, there was no need for the private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies and its action in seeking judicial redress is therefore justified.

Facts:

On May 9, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 449, otherwise known as the "Cockfighting Law of the Philippines" was promulgated by the President of the Philippines, requiring among others that cockpits "shall be constructed and operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in the zoning law or ordinance and in the absence of such law or ordinance, no cockpits shall be constructed within or near existing residential or commercial areas, hospitals, school buildings, churches or other public buildings." 

P.D. 449 gave owners, lessees or operators of cockpits then in existence which do not conform to the requirement three (3) years from the date of the effectivity of said decree to comply therewith.

On May 10, 1978, petitioner One Heart Sporting Club, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Sporting Club) a corporation still in the process of organization, through its manager Angeles B. Cuenca, applied for a permit to construct and operate a new cockpit at an appropriate site in Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City. A mayor's permit was granted and approved by the PC Regional Commander on September 19, 1978. The Sporting Club was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 19, 1978 and the sports complex built by the Sporting Club was inaugurated on September 24, 1978 and subsequently commenced its operation.

On September 29, 1978 the Bulletin Today reported that the President of the Philippines had issued P.D. 1535 on June 11, 1978 extending for another two (2) years from the date of the effectivity of the decree, or until June 11, 1980, within which existing cockpits could relocate within permissible areas.

On the same date, September 29, 1978, private respondent officially and formally requested the City Mayor of Dipolog City to allow it to resume cockpit operations in view of the extension granted by P.D. 1535. The City Mayor granted the request but the PC Provincial Command denied private respondent's application for a business permit for the reason that there was already an existing authorized cockpit in Dipolog City at the time, which is the Sporting Club, and the City can operate only one (1) cockpit at a time pursuant to Sec. 5 (b) of P.D. 1535

Issue: Whether private respondent is entitled to the extension granted by P.D. 1535.

Ruling: YES. 

Contrary to the above assertion, P.D. 1535 clearly intended to grant an extension to cockpits which are still located within the prohibited area to relocate the same in an appropriate site. P.D. 1535 would be a dead law if not applied to private respondent and others similarly situated, because legally, there would be no longer any cockpits existing in the country who failed to relocate its site on May 9, 1978 or if cockpits were still in existence within the prohibited area on said date, they would be operating illegally. The better view is to hold that private respondent's cockpit was still legally in existence when P.D. 1535 took effect. To hold otherwise would lead to a situation where there would be no cockpits that could avail of the extension granted by P.D. 1535.

The late release of P.D. 1535 is the cause of all the confusion. It was published in Bulletin Today only on September 29,1978 and in the Official Gazette on January 15, 1979. Undoubtedly, P.D. 1535 is intended to cover cockpits which have been granted an extension by a previous law, P.D. 1140.