Zabal v. Duterte G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019 Case Digest

Facts: 

Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who, at the time of the filing of the petition, were earning a living from the tourist activities therein. Zabal claims to build sandcastles for tourists while Jacosalem drives for tourists and workers in the island. While not a resident, Bandiola, for his part, claims to occasionally visit Boracay for business and pleasure. The three base their locus standi on direct injury and also from the transcendental importance doctrine. Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made public his plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao sometime February 2018. 

True to his words, President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson Harry L. Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally announced that the total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26, 2018.

Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about, fewer tourists had been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough to feed their families. They fear that if the closure pushes through, they would suffer grave and irreparable damage. Petitioners filed the petition on April 25, 2018 praying that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and/or a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION be immediately issued RESTRAINING and/or ENJOINING the respondents, and all persons acting under their command, order, and responsibility from enforcing a closure of Boracay Island or from banning the petitioners, tourists, and non-residents therefrom, and a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION directing the respondents, and all persons acting under their command, order, and responsibility to ALLOW all of the said persons to enter and/or leave Boracay Island unimpeded. 

On May 18, 2018, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition stating that the day following the filing of their original petition or on April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 formally declaring a state of calamity in Boracay and ordering its closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. 

The closure was implemented on even date. Thus, in addition to what they prayed for in their original petition, petitioners implore the Court to declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 475 insofar as it orders the closure of Boracay and ban of tourists and nonresidents therefrom. In the Resolutions dated April 26, 2018 and June 5, 2018, the Court required respondents to file their Comment on the Petition and the Supplemental Petition, respectively. Respondents filed their Consolidated Comment on July 30, 2018 while petitioners filed their Reply 17 thereto on October 12, 2018. 

On October 26, 2018, Boracay was reopened to tourism.

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure of Boracay constitute an impairment on a person’s right to travel.

HELD: NO.

The activities proposed to be undertaken to rehabilitate Boracay involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction. These could not have been implemented freely and smoothly with tourists coming in and out of the island not only because of the possible disruption that they may cause to the works being undertaken, but primarily because their safety and convenience might be compromised. Also, the contaminated waters in the island were not just confined to a small manageable area. 

The excessive water pollutants were all over Bolabog beach and the numerous illegal drainpipes connected to and discharging wastewater over it originate from different parts of the island. Indeed, the activities occasioned by the necessary digging of these pipes and the isolation of the contaminated beach waters to give way to treatment could not be done in the presence of tourists. Aside from the dangers that these contaminated waters pose, hotels, inns, and other accommodations may not be available as they would all be inspected and checked to determine their compliance with environmental laws. 

Moreover, it bears to state that a piece-meal closure of portions of the island would not suffice since as mentioned, illegal drainpipes extend to the beach from various parts of Boracay. Also, most areas in the island needed major structural rectifications because of numerous resorts and tourism facilities which lie along easement areas, illegally reclaimed wetlands, and of forested areas that were illegally cleared for construction purposes. 

Hence, the need to close the island in its entirety and ban tourists therefrom. In fine, this case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential sense contrary to what petitioners want to portray. 

Any bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom which were necessary incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. Also significant to note is that the closure of Boracay was only temporary considering the categorical pronouncement that it was only for a definite period of six months. Hence, if at all, the impact of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to travel is not direct but merely consequential; and, the same is only for a reasonably short period of time or merely temporary.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure of Boracay is a valid exercise of Police power.

 

HELD: YES. Police power, amongst the three fundamental and inherent powers of the state, is the most pervasive and comprehensive. "It has been defined as the 'state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare." "As defined, it consists of (1) imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of exact definition but has be purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace."

The police power "finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter" since "it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty." It is said to be the "inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of the society." Thus, police power constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. After all, "the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties. The assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of police power cannot be disputed. 

The motivating factor in the issuance of Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the public in general. Against the foregoing backdrop, we now pose this question: Was the temporary closure of Boracay as a tourist destination for six months reasonably necessary under the circumstances? 

The answer is in the affirmative. 

As earlier noted, one of the root causes of the problems that beset Boracay was tourist influx. Tourist arrivals in the island were clearly far more than Boracay could handle. As early as 2007, the DENR had already determined this as the major cause of the catastrophic depletion of the island's biodiversity. Also part of the equation is the lack of commitment to effectively enforce pertinent environmental laws. Unfortunately, direct action on these matters has been so elusive that the situation reached a critical level. Hence, by then, only bold and sweeping steps were required by the situation.

Certainly, the closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island its much needed breather, and likewise afforded the government the necessary leeway in its rehabilitation program. Note that apart from review, evaluation and amendment of relevant policies, the bulk of the rehabilitation activities involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction. These works could not have easily been done with tourists present. Also, time is of the essence. Every precious moment lost is to the detriment of Boracay's environment and of the health and well-being of the people thereat. Hence, any unnecessary distraction or disruption is most unwelcome. 

Moreover, as part of the rehabilitation efforts, operations of establishments in Boracay had to be halted in the course thereof since majority, if not all of them, need to comply with environmental and regulatory requirements in order to align themselves with the government's goal to restore Boracay into normalcy and develop its sustainability. Allowing tourists into the island while it was undergoing necessary rehabilitation would therefore be pointless as no establishment would cater to their accommodation and other needs. In any case, the closure, to emphasize, was only for a definite period of six months, i.e., from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. 

To the mind of the Court, this period constitutes a reasonable time frame, if not to complete, but to at least put in place the necessary rehabilitation works to be done in the island. Indeed, the temporary closure of Boracay, although unprecedented and radical as it may seem, was reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive under the circumstances. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the executive determination that the closure of Boracay was necessitated by the foregoing circumstances. As earlier noted, petitioners totally failed to counter the factual bases of, and justification for the challenged executive action.

PRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION (Chapter V)

 PRESUMPTIONS

In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the Courts will presume

that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible and

just law, and one which should change the prior law no further than may

be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of law, there

must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution.

The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive

authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and

determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted.

All laws are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise

ruled by the Court.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE

The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice

as this never within the legislative intent.

We interpret and apply the law in consonance with justice.

Judges do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,

yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause

and consequence.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and clear finding thereof

must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn.

In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be

construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency

and repugnancy exists in terms of the new and old laws.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the

assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective statute.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY

Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to

the legislative intention so as to avoid an unjust and absurd conclusion.

Presumption against undesirable consequences were never intended by a

legislative measure.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

Philippines as democratic and republican state adopts the generally

accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and

adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,

and amity with all nations. (Art. II, Sec. 2, Phil. Constitution).

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES (Chapter IV)

 WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS

SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH

When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The

rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words

and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and

general significance.

The courts should administer the law not as they think it ought to be but

as they find it and without regard to consequences.

· If the law makes no distinction, neither should the Court.

EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATUTE

When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except

something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

GENERAL AND SPECIAL TERMS

General terms in a statute are to receive a general construction, unless

retrained by the context or by plain inferences from the scope and

purpose of the act.

General terms or provisions in a statute may be restrained and limited

by specific terms or provisions with which they are associated.

Special terms in a statute may sometimes be expanded to a general

signification by the consideration that the reason of the law is general

GENERAL TERMS FOLLOWING SPECIAL TERMS

(EJUSDEM GENERIS)

It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words

follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and

specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their

widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of

the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. But this

rule must be discarded where the legislative intention is plain to the

contrary.

This rule is commonly called the “ejusdem generis” rule, because it

teaches us that broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as

“and all others”, or “any others”, are usually to be restricted to persons

or things “of the same kind” or class with those specially named in the

preceding words.

Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted

to when legislative intent is uncertain.

EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCLUSION

It is a general rule of statutory construction that the express mention of

one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion

of all others. “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”.

Except:

· When there is manifest of injustice

· When there is no reason for exception.

ASSOCIATED WORDS (NOSCITUR SOCIIS)

Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its

correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of

terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

USE OF NEGATIVE WORDS

Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those

affirmative are mere directory.

The word “shall” emphasizes mandatory character and means

imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.

THE USE OF THE WORD “MAY” AND “SHALL” IN THE

STATUTE

Use of the word “may” in the statute generally connotes a permissible

thing, and operates to confer discretion while the word “shall” is

imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.

The term “shall” may be either as mandatory or directory depending

upon a consideration of the entire provision in which it is found, its

object and consequences that would follow from construing it one way or

the other.

USE OF THE WORD “MUST”

The word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always imperative and

may be consistent with an exercise discretion.

THE USE OF THE TERM “AND” AND THE WORD “OR”

“And” means conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the

idea that the latter is to be added or taken along with the first.

“Or” is a disjunctive particle used to express as alternative or to give a

choice of one among two or more things. It is also used to clarify what

has already been said, and in such cases, means “in other words,” “to

wit,” or “that is to say.”

COMPUTATION OF TIME

When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be

understood that years are of three hundred sixty five days each; months of thirty days; days of twenty –four hours; and nights from sunset to

sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the

number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day

included (Art. 13, New Civil Code).

A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the

day of the week on which it begins.

FUNCTION OF THE PROVISO

Proviso is a clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which

is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or

restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of

misinterpretation of its extent.

“Provided” is the word used in introducing a proviso.

Statutes (Chapter II)

LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES

The power to make laws is lodged in the legislative department of the

government.

A statute starts with a bill.

Bill – is the draft of a proposed law from the time of its introduction in a

legislative body through all the various stages in both houses. It is

enacted into law by a vote of the legislative body. An “Act” is the

appropriate term for it after it has been acted on and passed by the

legislature. It then becomes a statute, the written will of the legislature

solemnly expressed according to the form necessary to constitute it as

the law of the state.

“Statute Law” is a term often used interchangeably with the word

“statute”. Statute Law, however, is broader in meaning since it includes

not only statute but also the judicial interpretation and application of the

enactment.

HOW DOES A BILL BECOMES A LAW – STEPS

A bill before it becomes a law must pass the strict constitutional

requirements explicit both in the 1973 Constitution and the 1987

Constitution.

Passage of a bill in a parliamentary system (unicameral assembly):

a. A member of the National Assembly may introduce the proposed bill

to the Secretary of the National Assembly who will calendar the same

for the first reading.

b. In the first reading, the bill is read by its number and title only.

c. After the first reading, the bill is referred by the Speaker to the

appropriate committee for study. At this stage, the appropriate

committee will conduct public hearings. Then after the public

hearings, the committee shall decide whether or not to report the bill

favorably or whether a substitute bill should be considered. Should

there be an unfavorable report of the committee, then the proposed

bill is dead.

d. Upon favorable action by the committee, the bill is returned to the

National Assembly and shall be calendared for the second reading.

e. In the second reading, the bill is read in its entirety.

f. Immediately after the second reading, the bill is set for open debates

where members of the assembly may propose amendments and

insertions to the proposed bill.

g. After the approval of the bill in its second reading and at least three

(3) calendar days before its final passage, the bill is printed in its final

form and copies thereof distributed to each of the members.

h. The bill is then calendared for the third and final reading. At this

stage, no amendment shall be allowed. Only the title of the bill is

read and the National Assembly will then vote on the bill. Under the

present 1987b Constitution, after the third and final reading at one

House where the bill originated, it will go to the other House where it

will undergo the same process.

i. After the bill has been passed, it will be submitted to the Prime

Minister (President) for approval. If he disapproves, he shall veto it

and return the same with his objections to the National Assembly

(House where it originated), and if approved by two-thirds of all its

members, shall become a law. Under the present set-up, if the

originating house will agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together

with the objections to the other house by which it shall be likewise be

considered and must be approved by two-thirds of the votes. Every

bill passed by Congress shall be acted upon by the President within

thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Otherwise, it shall become a law.

CONSTITUTIONAL TEST IN THE PASSAGE OF A BILL

Three (3) very important constitutional requirements in the enactment of

statute:

1. Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which

shall be expressed in the title thereof. The purposes of this

constitutional requirements are:

· To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;

· To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature; and

· To fairly apprise the people, through such publications of

legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of

legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have

opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they

shall so desire.

2. No bill passed by either House shall become law unless it has passed

three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final

form have been distributed to each member three days before its

passage.

3. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be

presented to the President. The executive approval and veto power of

the President is the third important constitutional requirement in the

mechanical passage of a bill.

PARTS OF STATUTE

a. Title – the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by

which the act is individually known. It is usually prefixed to the

statute in the brief summary of its contents.

b. Preamble – part of statute explaining the reasons for its enactment

and the objects sought to be accomplished. Usually, it starts with

“whereas”.

c. Enacting clause – part of statute which declares its enactment and

serves to identify it as an act of legislation proceeding from the proper

legislative authority. “Be enacted” is the usual formula used to start

this clause.

d. Body – the main and operative part of the statute containing its

substantive and even procedural provisions. Provisos and exceptions

may also be found.

e. Repealing Clause - announces the prior statutes or specific

provisions which have been abrogated by reason of the enactment of

the new law.

f. Saving Clause – restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to

save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc. from the annihilation

which would result from an unrestricted repeal.

g. Separability Clause – provides that in the event that one or more

provisions or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall still be

in force.

h. Effectivity Clause – announces the effective date of the law.

KINDS OF STATUTES

1. General Law – affects the community at large. That which affects all

people of the state or all of a particular class.

2. Special Law – designed for a particular purpose, or limited in range

or confined to a prescribed field of action on operation.

3. Local Law – relates or operates over a particular locality instead of

over the whole territory of the state.

4. Public Law – a general classification of law, consisting generally of

constitutional, administrative, criminal, and international law,

concerned with the organization of the state, the relations between

the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public

officers of the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the

relations of state to one another. Public law may be general, local or

special law.

5. Private Law – defines, regulates, enforces and administers

relationships among individuals, associations and corporations.

6. Remedial Statute – providing means or method whereby causes of

action may be affectuated, wrongs redressed and relief obtained.

7. Curative Statute – a form of retrospective legislation which reaches

back into the past to operate upon past events, acts or transactions in

order to correct errors and irregularities and to render valid and

effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for

the purpose intended.

8. Penal Statute – defines criminal offenses specify corresponding fines

and punishments.

9. Prospective Law – applicable only to cases which shall arise after its

enactment.

10. Retrospective Law – looks backward or contemplates the past; one

which is made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring,

before it came into force.

11. Affirmative Statute – directs the doing of an act, or declares what

shall be done in contrast to a negative statute which is one that

prohibits the things from being done, or declares what shall not be

done.

12. Mandatory Statutes – generic term describing statutes which require

and not merely permit a course of action.

CONCEPT OF VAGUE STATUTES

Statues or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible

standards those men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at

its meaning and differ as to its application.

Statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects:

1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of

conduct to avoid; and

2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretions.

The Supreme Court held that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a

reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld--- not absolute

precision or mathematical exactitude. Flexibility, rather than meticulous

specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute

are clearly delineated

REPEALS OF STATUTE MAY BE EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED

Express repeal – is the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing

law by the enactment of a subsequent statute which declares that the

former law shall be revoked and abrogated.

Implied repeal – when a later statute contains provisions so contrary to

irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two

statutes can stand in force.

The repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish

persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal.

Only a law can repeal a law.

The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest, otherwise, at least,

as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,

and not a substitute for, the first act.

Two (2) categories of repeal by implication:

1. Where provision in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an

irreconcilable conflict;

2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is

clearly intended as a substitute – to be a complete and perfect system

in itself.

ORDINANCE

Ordinance – an act passed by the local legislative body in the exercise of

its law-making authority.

TEST OF VALID ORDINANCE

1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2. Must not be unfair or oppressive;

3. Must not be partial or discriminatory;

4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

5. Must be general and consistent with public policy; and

6. Must not be unreasonable.

REASON WHY AN ORDINANCE SHOULD NOT

CONTRAVENE A STATUTE

Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on

them by Congress as the national law making body.

The delegate cannot be superior to the principal.

ROLE OF FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE

Philippine laws must necessarily be construed in accordance with the

intention of its own law makers and such intent may be deduced from

the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related

thereof.

BASIC GUIDELINES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS LEGISLATIVE INTENT (Chapter III)

The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to

ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature, to the end that

the same may be enforced.

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the

statute.

VERBA LEGIS

If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and

express a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is

conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended

to convey.

STATUTES AS A WHOLE

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent must be

ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not

merely of a particular provision. A word or phrase might easily convey a

meaning which is different from the one actually intended.

A statute should be construed as a whole because it is not to be

presumed that the legislature has used any useless words, and because

it is dangerous practice to base the construction upon only a part of it,

since one portion may be qualified by other portions.

SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW

When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal

import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences,

or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,

disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of

the law.

· When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

· Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as

much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

CASUS OMISSUS

When a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several

enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any provision for a case

or object which is analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon

the same reason, and is therefore within the general scope of the statute,

and it appears that such case or object was omitted by inadvertence or

because it was overlooked or unforeseen, it is called a “casus omissus”.

Such omissions or defects cannot be supplied by the courts.

The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and

apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.

STARE DECISIS

It is the doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle, and

apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same,

regardless of whether the parties and properties are the same.

Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been

settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated

again and again.

“Stare decisis et non quieta movere” (follow past precedents and do not

disturb what has been settled.

Statutory Construction (Chapter I)

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEFINED

Statutory Construction – the art or process of discovering and

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with

respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered

doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not

explicitly provided for in the law.

Justice Martin defines statutory construction as the art of seeking the

intention of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a

given state of facts.

A judicial function is required when a statute is invoked and different

interpretations are in contention.

Difference between judicial legislation and statutory construction:

Where legislature attempts to do several things one which is invalid, it

may be discarded if the remainder of the act is workable and in no way

depends upon the invalid portion, but if that portion is an integral part of

the act, and its excision changes the manifest intent of the act by

broadening its scope to include subject matter or territory which was not

included therein as enacted, such excision is “judicial legislation” and

not “statutory construction”.

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION, DISTINGUISHED

Construction is the drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that

are beyond the direct expression of the text, while interpretation is the

process of discovering the true meaning of the language used.

Interpretation is limited to exploring the written text. Construction on

the other hand is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie

beyond the direct expressions of the text.

SITUS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

In our system of government:

· Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines – the

Senate and the House of the Representatives

· Executive power is vested in the President of the Republic of the

Philippines (Art. VII, Sec.1, Phil. Const.)

· Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower

courts as may be established by law. (Art VIII, Sec. 1, Phil. Const.)

Legislative – makes the law

Executive - executes the law

Judicial – interprets the law

Simply stated, the situs of construction and interpretation of written

laws belong to the judicial department.

It is the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to

determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the government.

Supreme Court is the one and only Constitutional Court and all other

lower courts are statutory courts and such lower courts have the power

to construe and interpret written laws.

DUTY OF THE COURTS TO CONSTRUE AND INTERPRET

THE LAW; REQUISITES

1. There must be an actual case or controversy,

2. There is ambiguity in the law involved in the controversy.

Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in a

statute, document, etc.

A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more possible

meanings.

If the law is clear and unequivocal, the Court has no other alternative

but to apply the law and not to interpret.