Friday, February 12, 2021

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES (Chapter IV)

 WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS

SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH

When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The

rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words

and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and

general significance.

The courts should administer the law not as they think it ought to be but

as they find it and without regard to consequences.

· If the law makes no distinction, neither should the Court.

EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATUTE

When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except

something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

GENERAL AND SPECIAL TERMS

General terms in a statute are to receive a general construction, unless

retrained by the context or by plain inferences from the scope and

purpose of the act.

General terms or provisions in a statute may be restrained and limited

by specific terms or provisions with which they are associated.

Special terms in a statute may sometimes be expanded to a general

signification by the consideration that the reason of the law is general

GENERAL TERMS FOLLOWING SPECIAL TERMS

(EJUSDEM GENERIS)

It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words

follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and

specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their

widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of

the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. But this

rule must be discarded where the legislative intention is plain to the

contrary.

This rule is commonly called the “ejusdem generis” rule, because it

teaches us that broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as

“and all others”, or “any others”, are usually to be restricted to persons

or things “of the same kind” or class with those specially named in the

preceding words.

Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted

to when legislative intent is uncertain.

EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCLUSION

It is a general rule of statutory construction that the express mention of

one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion

of all others. “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”.

Except:

· When there is manifest of injustice

· When there is no reason for exception.

ASSOCIATED WORDS (NOSCITUR SOCIIS)

Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its

correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of

terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

USE OF NEGATIVE WORDS

Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those

affirmative are mere directory.

The word “shall” emphasizes mandatory character and means

imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.

THE USE OF THE WORD “MAY” AND “SHALL” IN THE

STATUTE

Use of the word “may” in the statute generally connotes a permissible

thing, and operates to confer discretion while the word “shall” is

imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.

The term “shall” may be either as mandatory or directory depending

upon a consideration of the entire provision in which it is found, its

object and consequences that would follow from construing it one way or

the other.

USE OF THE WORD “MUST”

The word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always imperative and

may be consistent with an exercise discretion.

THE USE OF THE TERM “AND” AND THE WORD “OR”

“And” means conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the

idea that the latter is to be added or taken along with the first.

“Or” is a disjunctive particle used to express as alternative or to give a

choice of one among two or more things. It is also used to clarify what

has already been said, and in such cases, means “in other words,” “to

wit,” or “that is to say.”

COMPUTATION OF TIME

When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be

understood that years are of three hundred sixty five days each; months of thirty days; days of twenty –four hours; and nights from sunset to

sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the

number of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day

included (Art. 13, New Civil Code).

A “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the

day of the week on which it begins.

FUNCTION OF THE PROVISO

Proviso is a clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which

is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or

restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of

misinterpretation of its extent.

“Provided” is the word used in introducing a proviso.

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