Ramon Debuque v. Matt Nilson G.R. No. 191718, May 10, 2021, THIRD DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

 

Ramon Debuque v. Matt Nilson

G.R. No. 191718, May 10, 2021, THIRD DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

Implied conspiracy, as correctly ruled by the CA, must be proved "through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of [the] crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest."

Facts:

This case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit for Syndicated Estafa filed by respondent Matt C. Nilson (Nilson) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City against Ramon and the other accused.

Nilson alleged that while he was the Managing Director of Tongsat, he met Atty. Debuque, who was then the Chairman of Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc. (DOMSAT). They developed a professional relationship and eventually became friends. Subsequently, Atty. Debuque was able to borrow sizable funds from Nilson numerous times.

Atty. Debuque, who was also acting on behalf of the other accused, invited Nilson to join them in a business venture. He promised Nilson shares of stock in Investa Land Corporation (ILC), a corporation then to be formed, equivalent to the value of the numerous personal loans extended to him by Nilson. Atty. Debuque also induced Nilson to purchase various commercial lots in partnership with him, stating that the value of the lands will rise exponentially, and that these will be transferred in the name of ILC. Consequently, on two occasions, Nilson paid Atty. Debuque sums of money as his share in the purchase price of commercial lots located in General Santos City.

Nilson, however, thereafter claimed that the lots were not commercial lands and were represented as such to induce him to pay a higher price. The Land Registration Authority, however, reported that the said title was questionable.

In a Joint Resolution, Assistant City Prosecutor Ramolete found probable cause to charge Atty. Debuque and the other accused with Syndicated Estafa in relation to PD 1689. The said Joint Resolution found probable cause for the crime of Syndicated Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 16897 (PD 1689) against petitioner Ramon H. Debuque (Ramon) and other individuals not included as parties in this Petition.

Meanwhile, on May 19, 2006, an Information for Syndicated Estafa was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against Ramon, Atty. Debuque, and the other accused. The Resolution of the DOJ Secretary dated August 23, 2007, reversed the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor, and ordered the filing of an Information for Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC only against Atty. Debuque.

The Appellate court reversed the last Resolution of the DOJ Secretary and reinstated the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor finding probable cause for Syndicated Estafa against all accused. Aggrieved, Ramon by himself elevated the case to this Court. He further alleges that the elements of Syndicated Estafa are not present, making the CA's finding of probable cause erroneous. He insists that he has absolutely no participation in the transactions between Atty. Debuque and Nilson.

Issue: Whether there was probable cause to indict Ramon for the crime of Syndicated Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, as amended, in relation to PD 1689.

Ruling: Yes. However, the Court finds the instant case already moot and academic.

In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court ruled that once the information has been filed before the courts, the dismissal, conviction, or acquittal of the accused rests on their sound discretion; they are not bound by any change in the opinion of the prosecutor or his superior regarding probable cause. The courts should not blindly follow the resolutions issued by the DOJ and should determine on their own whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial.

In the instant case, the RTC and the CA have already ruled on the merits of the criminal case that resulted to Ramon's acquittal. Following Crespo and De Lima, the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA to assail the latest Resolution of the DOJ Secretary has become moot. It follows then that this Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court to assail that CA Decision (on probable cause) has also become moot; hence, it is only proper that it be dismissed.

The Court find that the CA erred in finding that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the August 23, 2007 Resolution. The DOJ Secretary correctly found no probable cause to indict the accused for the crime of Syndicated Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC, as amended, in relation to PD 1689. The DOJ Secretary was correct in resolving that only Atty. Debuque should be held liable for Estafa.

The Court finds no existing syndicate in which Ramon and the other accused had any participation. As found by the DOJ Secretary, Atty. Debuque acted on his own, without the participation or involvement of Ramon or the other accused. Atty. Debuque was never authorized by the ILC shareholders, i.e., Ramon and the other accused, to transact with Nilson. The third standard provided in Remo, therefore, is not satisfied. There is simply no proof that all of the accused, including Ramon, acted through ILC in defrauding Nilson.

Therefore, there being no syndicate in the first place, only Atty. Debuque is to be held personally liable. The DOJ Secretary, in his August 23, 2007 Resolution, correctly found probable cause for Estafa only against him. However, as stated, this criminal case for Estafa may not be initiated anymore due to his death.

 

Spouses Dulay v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

 Spouses Dulay v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

Deceit is rarely simple and far from cut and dried. Although ostensibly uncomplicated, deception in various forms of dissembling, suppression of truth, concealment and misrepresentation, once established beyond reasonable doubt will give rise to criminal liability.

Facts:

Claiming to be the actual owners of a 450-square meter lot in Baguio City, petitioners sold it to private complainants, the spouses Isabelo and Hilaria Dulos (Hilaria; collectively as spouses Dulos); hence, petitioners were charged with estafa under Article 315 2(a) of the RPC.

Before the arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the RTC . The RTC ruled that: (1) the trial court has jurisdiction to try the case for estafa under Article 315 2(a) of the RFC, and (2) there is no other pending criminal case before the first level courts of Agoo, La Union which constitutes as litis pendentia. Thus, at the arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty.

The RTC found petitioners guilty of Estafa under Article 315, (2)(a) of the RPC.
The trial court ruled that all the elements of estafa by deceit under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RFC were established and proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioners, through false pretenses and fraudulent acts of ostensible ownership of the subject property, deceived the spouses Dulos into buying the property and. paying the total amount of P707,000.00.

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed petitioners' conviction and modified their liability for civil damages to include payment of interest. The lower courts uniformly found that petitioners sold the subject property to the spouses Dulos under false pretenses of ownership.

Issue:

1.     Whether petitioners are guilty of the crime of Estafa when private complainants were aware that the subject property was not in their names at the time of the transaction.

Ruling: There is no merit in petitioners' appeal.

As found by the lower courts, petitioners are not the owners, more so registered owners, of the subject property. Yet, they brazenly sold the property to the spouses Dulos which they do not own under any color of title. In fact, petitioners' deceit is emphasized by the vacillating defenses they invoked.

Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC provides:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

x x x

Jurisprudence has long established the elements of Estafa by means of deceit as defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC:

(1) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
(2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(3) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
(4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

The Court abided the uniform factual findings of the lower courts which establish petitioners' commission of estafa by deceit through false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentation.

First. Petitioners made false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations to complainants, the spouses Dulos, consisting of the following untruthful claims

Here, petitioners employed a scheme of dissembling against the spouses Dulos by withholding from the latter the true registered owners of the subject property under TCT No. T-2135. Petitioners took advantage of the demise of the real registered owners, the spouses Isidro and Virginia Dulay and more importantly, the similarity in the names of the two Isidros who are related and share the exact same name, i.e., Isidro Dulay.

Petitioners' deceit is illustrated by their inconsistent and conflicting claims (a) that title to the subject property is simply being reconstituted to reflect their names, (b) that they are the same persons as Isidro and Virginia Dulay, and (c) that petitioner Isidro is a putative heir of Maria, the purported registered owner of the subject property prior to the registered owners reflected in TCT No. T-2135.

Second. As found by the lower courts, the second, third and fourth elements of the offense are likewise present.

Jurisprudence further distinguishes criminal fraud from civil fraud. People v. Aquino instructs:

[T]he gravamen of the [crime of Estafa] is the employment of fraud or deceit to the damage or prejudice of another. When fraud pertains to the means of committing a crime or the classes of crimes under Chapter Three, Title Four, , Book Two and Chapter Three, Title Seven, Book Two of the RPC, criminal liability may arise; otherwise, if fraud merely causes loss or injury to another, without being an element of a crime, then it may only be classified as civil fraud from which an action for damages may arise.

As demonstrated herein, petitioners committed estafa by deceit under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the RPC.

 

 

Talabis v. People G.R. No. 214647, March 04, 2020, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

 

Talabis v. People

G.R. No. 214647, March 04, 2020, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

               Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting, and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.

Facts:

Leonora Edoc and Rhoda E. Bay-An filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint against petitioner and Arsebino before the Office of Provincial Prosecutor of La Trinidad, Benguet. After preliminary investigation, petitioner and Arsebino were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of PD 705 in an Information.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After trial on the merits, the RTC found petitioner and Arsebino guilty as charged.

Petitioner, in his Brief, although not raised as an assignment of error, discussed for the consideration of the CA that since the offended party under PD 705 is the government, the complaint against petitioner and Arsebino should have been filed by a DENR official, and not by Leonora and Rhoda who are merely private individuals.
Thereafter, the CA, in its Decision, affirmed the Judgment of the RTC with modifications

Issues:

(1) Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case even though it was based on a complaint filed by Leonora and Rhoda, who are private individuals, and not by a DENR forest officer; and

(2) Whether petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of old age and of voluntary surrender.

Ruling:

1. Yes.  The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case.

Section 80 of PD 705 contemplates two instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for violations of PD 705. The first instance, on one hand, contemplates a situation where a forest officer arrests without a warrant any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in PD 705. On the other hand, the second instance contemplates a situation where an offense described in PD 705 is not committed in the presence of the forest officer and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint.

In both cases, the forest officer shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary information in court.

In other words, Section 80 of PD 705 contemplates situations where acts in violation of the law were committed in the presence of forest officers, or when reports or complaints of violations of PD 705, albeit not committed in their presence, are brought to the attention of forest officers by other forest officers or any deputized officers or officials. In such cases, PD 705 specifically recognizes the special authority of forest officers to file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases after said forest officer has conducted a warrantless arrest, seizure or confiscation of property, or after his receipt of a complaint of report of violations of PD 705, as the case may be.

All told, Section 89 of PD 705 should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations and file criminal complaints regarding offenses described in PD 705. Rather, said provision should be construed as a recognition and reinforcement of their special authority to conduct warrantless arrests, seize and confiscate property, and proceeding therefrom, file the necessary complaints against forestry law offenders.

2. No. Petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration of the January 16, 2014 Decision of the CA where, for the first time, he brought to the attention of the CA the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and old age for the purpose of modifying and imposing the proper penalty against him. As his motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner now imputes fault on the CA for not appreciating the two mitigating circumstances in his favor.

The CA was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the belatedly raised issue of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

"For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present, to wit: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture."

Thus, if such mitigating circumstance was considered by the CA, or this Court for that matter, the prosecution would be denied due process as it would have been denied the opportunity to present evidence to disprove that petitioner did surrender spontaneously and voluntarily to the authorities.

In any event, issues raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel. Failure to assert issues and arguments "within a reasonable time" warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.

Accordingly, the supposed failure on the part of the CA to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in petitioner's favor cannot now be raised as an assignment of error in the present petition.

The Court, however, is aware that herein petitioner is 83 years old as of date as evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Buguias, Benguet. While petitioner could have likewise alleged his advanced age before the RTC, this Court, for equitable and humanitarian considerations, cannot simply ignore and disregard the same for the sole purpose of determining the proper penalty to be meted out against him.

Owing to petitioner's advanced age, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period pursuant to Article 64(2) of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the "minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense" or prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or anywhere between 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months, while the maximum penalty shall be fixed anywhere between 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period.

Pante y Rangasa v. People G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021, THIRD DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

 

Pante y Rangasa v. People
G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021, THIRD DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

Time and again, this Court has held that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime. Mere denials are only self-serving evidence whose evidentiary weight cannot outweigh the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.

Facts:

An Information was filed before the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur against petitioner Pante and his two minor co-accused, charging them with the crime of Theft under Article 308, par. 2, subparagraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Upon arraignment, Pante and his two co-accused entered separate pleas of "not guilty."

In its Judgment, the RTC found all three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. The evidence submitted by the prosecution proved that Word lost his money, and that the accused-minor was the finder thereof, and who shared the cash he found with his co-accused cousin and Pante, the latter both knowing where the money came from. While the trial Court was convinced that Word lost dollar bills in the amount of US$4,450, the prosecution failed to prove that he also lost money in Philippine currency. It found that Pante got US$1,700.00, while the two accused-minor netted US$500.00 and US$2,350.00 each. The trial court noted that Pante even instructed the two minors not to return the money. Instead of encouraging them to return the cash, Pante got a portion for himself and headed home. Thus, the trial court did not give credence to Pante's position that he did not have any interest in keeping the money. Neither can his act of returning the money be considered voluntary since he already knew that Word was looking for his lost money and he only returned it upon the arrival of police authorities in his house.

Aggrieved, Pante appealed the judgment of conviction before the CA, arguing that the prosecution did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CA, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the RTC's ruling.

Issue:

(a) Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of the petitioner for the crime charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  

Ruling: No. The Petition is unmeritorious.

The CA correctly found that the prosecution sufficiently established Pante's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. Under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC, Theft is also committed by one's failure to deliver lost property to its owner or local authorities. In this kind of Theft, it is essential to prove: 1) the finding of lost property; 2) the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities or its owner.

In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that the prosecution witnesses were able to prove that Word lost his bundled money after alighting from his car in front of his residence and forgetting that he had placed them in between his legs. Such fact was corroborated by the prosecution witness who testified that he positively saw the accused-minor pick up the bundle of money under Word's car. In the same vein, all three accused admitted that it was the accused-minor who found the bundle of money in front of the bakery, which they later divided among themselves in the following manner: US$1,700.00 for Pante; and US$500.00 and US$2,350.00 for each of the two accused-minor. Despite knowing that the money did not rightfully belong to them, Pante encouraged the two minor accused to keep the money for themselves.

In fine, a "finder" under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder of the lost property since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the property found Though not the actual finder, but there is also no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his two co-accused minor did not own the subject money. He knew for a fact that his co-accused minor merely found the money along the road while the latter was delivering bread. Instead of returning the money, Pante convinced his co-accused minors not to return the money and to divide it among themselves. At that moment, Pante placed himself precisely in the situation as if he was the actual finder. Otherwise stated, petitioner was a "finder in law," if not in fact; and his act in appropriating the money was of precisely of the same character as if it had been originally found by him.

 

Florencio B. Destriza Vs. Fair Shipping Corporation G.R. No. 203539. February 10, 2021, Third Division, (Hernando, J.)

 

Florencio B. Destriza Vs. Fair Shipping Corporation

G.R. No. 203539. February 10, 2021, Third Division, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

Certainly, disability compensation cannot rest on mere allegations couched in conjectures and baseless inferences from which work-aggravation or relatedness cannot be presumed. "Bare allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of compensability. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition.

Facts:

Destriza filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, medical reimbursement, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) against the respondents FSC, Cachapero and Boseline.

FSC is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. Baseline is a foreign juridical entity engaged in the business of shipping. FSC is Baseline's local manning agent in the Philippines while Cachapero is the President of FSC.

Destriza is a seafarer formerly employed by FSC for its foreign principal Baseline. He was first deployed by FSC in 2001 as a cook aboard M/V Pacific Venus. He was again deployed in 2002 in the same capacity aboard M/V Tocho-Maru.

On or about December 10, 2003, while on board M/V Cygnus, Destriza experienced abdominal pain, fever, and yellowish discoloration of the skin and eyes. He was rushed to a hospital in Nagoya, Japan where he was diagnosed with biliary duct stone, jaundice, and suspected pancreatitis. After his discharge from the hospital, he was medically repatriated to his home country for further treatment.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, Destriza was immediately referred to FSC's company physician, Dr. Nicomedes Cruz. He underwent cholecystectomy and intraoperative cholangiogram in Medical Center Manila. He was diagnosed with "Chronic Calculus Cholecystitis." In a Report, Dr. Cruz stated that Destriza was "evaluated by their gastroenterologist who allowed him to resume his previous activities," and declared him fit to return to work. The treatment was shouldered by FSC.

However, Destriza insisted that he remained unfit as he continued to experience recurring and severe abdominal pains. This prompted him to undergo a medical check-up with Dr. Donato-Tan, a cardiologist, on October 14, 2004. He was subsequently admitted to a hospital on December 10 to 16, 2004. After his discharge, Dr. Donato-Tan concluded that he was "unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity."

In a Resolution, the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) ruled that Destriza is not entitled to permanent disability benefits in view of the declaration of the company physician that he was fit to work. It also ruled that Destriza is not entitled to attorney's fees. However, the panel awarded Destriza the amount of US$20,000.00 because he contracted his illness while on board M/V Cygnus.

In its Decision, the CA modified the PVA's Resolution by deleting the award of US$20,000.00 for lack of legal basis.The award could not be classified as disability benefits as defined in the POEA Standard Employment Contract because Destriza failed to show that his illness was work-related or that the ship's working conditions aggravated it. The CA also gave greater weight on Dr. Cruz's finding that Destriza is fit to return to work, thereby negating Destriza's claim for disability benefits.

Issues:  

Whether Destriza is entitled to disability benefits as previously awarded by the PVA.

Ruling: No. The Court affirms the assailed Decision of the CA finding Destriza not entitled to the award of US$20,000.00.

The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247, series of 1987 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas."

The POEA Standard Employment Contract governs Destriza's claim for disability benefits. Since his contract was signed on February 10, 2003 and approved by the POEA on February 12, 2003, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, series of 2000 applies in this case and is deemed integrated in Destriza's contract.

Section 20 of Memorandum Circular No. 9 provides that for an illness or injury to be compensable, it must be work-related and must be incurred during the term of the seafarer's contract. It defines work-related illness as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."

Notably, the list does not include Chronic Calculus Cholecystitis. However, Section 20 of Memorandum Circular No. 9 provides that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related."

Similarly, for an illness to be compensable, "it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer." It is enough that there is "a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had."

The disputable presumption implies "that the non-inclusion in the list of compensable diseases/illnesses does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits." There is still a need for the claimant to establish, through substantial evidence, that his illness is work­ related.

Thus, if an illness is not included in the list under Section 32-A of Memorandum Circular No. 9, it is disputably presumed as work-related. Despite the disputable presumption, case law such as Madridejos provides that to be compensable, the seafarer still has the burden to establish, by substantial evidence, that his illness is work-related. As stated, the disputable presumption does not amount to an automatic grant of compensation.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Destriza was suffering from Chronic Calculus Cholecystitis due to development of gallstones. Since Chronic Calculus Cholecystitis and even contracting of gallstones are not included in Section 32-A of Memorandum Circular No. 9, Destriza had the burden of establishing, by substantial evidence, that his illness was work-related or was at least aggravated by work. In short, he had the burden of showing that he contracted gallstones because of his work as cook in M/V Cygnus.

The Court agrees with the CA that Destriza failed to establish work-relatedness relative to his illness. The records do not show that the cause of the development of his gallstones resulting to Chronic Calculus Cholecystitis was his work as cook aboard the vessel. He merely presented general averments and allegations that the hot temperature and constant meat or high fat diet aboard the vessel caused or aggravated the development of his gallstones.

In addition, Destriza's failure to resort to a third-doctor opinion proved fatal to his cause. It is settled that in case of disagreements between the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, resort to a third-doctor opinion is mandatory. The third-doctor opinion is final and binding between the parties. The opinion of the company-designated physician prevails over that of the seafarer's personal doctor in case there is no third-doctor opinion. Thus, Dr. Cruz's declaration that Destriza is fit to resume sea duties prevails over the medical opinion issued by Dr. Donato-Tan.

Finally, it does not escape the Court that FSC conditionally paid Destriza the peso equivalent of the award in the amount of P902,440.00. In view of this, Destriza shall return the amount paid to him by FSC.

Engineering & Construction Corporation of Asia v. Palle G.R. No. 201247, July 13, 2020, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

 

Engineering & Construction Corporation of Asia v. Palle

G.R. No. 201247, July 13, 2020, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

It is necessary to note that an employer has the burden to prove that the employee is indeed a project employee. Thus, "the employer must establish that (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a particular project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which was specified at the time of engagement."

Facts:

Petitioner ECCA, now known as First Balfour Incorporated, is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business.  Respondents Palle, Velosa, Pampanga, Galabo, Galapin and Felicitas (collectively, respondents) were hired by ECCA on various dates to work in its construction business.

The instant case stemmed from the illegal dismissal complaint filed in 2004 by the respondents with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against ECCA and its president, Oscar Lopez.

ECCA claimed that respondents, as project employees, were validly terminated in view of the project's completion. It pointed out that respondents were not regular employees, but merely project employees since they were hired for a specific project or undertaking, the termination of which was determined at the time they were hired. On the other hand, Respondents mainly argued that they were not project employees but were regular employees of ECCA. They claimed that ECCA hired them on different dates to perform tasks which were necessary and desirable in its construction business.

The Labor Arbiter held that respondents were regular employees of ECCA. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that the company has not presented any document showing that in every termination of the project, respondents' employment was also terminated. Furthermore, the Labor Arbiter also noted that respondents were hired by ECCA for one project but were later repeatedly rehired for more than 20 to 30 years in several other projects. Thus, this showed that respondents have become regular employees of ECCA. The Labor Arbiter emphasized that where the employment of project employees is extended long after the first project had been finished, the employees are removed from the scope of project employment and are considered regular employees.

Aggrieved, ECCA filed an appeal with the NLRC. In decision, the NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and granted ECCA's appeal.

Issues:

Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed as regular employees or validly terminated in view of the completion of their contract as project employees.

Ruling: Yes. Respondents were regular employees who were illegally terminated.

The Supreme Court uphold the findings of the CA that respondents were regular employees who were illegally terminated.

Regular and Project Employees, distinguished.

Article 295 [280] of the Labor Code provides the following definition of regular and project employees:

ARTICLE 295. [280] Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed, and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

On the other hand, DOLE's Department Order No. 19, series of 1993 (D.O. No. 19), otherwise known as the Guidelines Governing the Employment of Workers in the Construction Industry, provides:

An employment is generally deemed regular where: (i) the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, subject to exceptions, such as when one is a fixed, project or seasonal employee; or (ii) the employee has been engaged for at least a year, with respect to the activity he or she is hired, and the employment of such employee remains while such activity exists.

On the other hand, a project employee "is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee." Thus, the "services of project-based employees are co-terminous with the project and may be terminated upon the end or completion of the project or a phase thereof for which they were hired.

The Court find that ECCA failed to present substantial evidence to show that it informed respondents of the duration and scope of their work at the time of their hiring. Upon careful review of the company's respective contracts of employment with respondents, this Court holds that the employment contracts were lacking in detail to prove that respondents had been duly informed of the duration and scope of their work, and of their status as project employees at the time of their hiring. The respective contracts of respondents may have been dated at the time of their issuance, but nowhere did said contracts show as to when respondents supposedly signed or received the same or were informed of the contents thereof. This gives rise to the distinct possibility that respondents were not informed of their status as project employees, as well as the scope and duration of the projects that were assigned to them at the time of their engagement. Thus, ECCA failed to refute respondents' claim that they worked in new projects, or they were transferred to other existing projects without the benefit of their corresponding employment contracts. Therefore, ECCA failed to persuasively show that respondents herein were informed at the time of their engagement that their work was only for the duration of the project.

Moreover, ECCA failed to present other evidence or other written contracts to show that it informed respondents of the duration and scope of their work. Settled is the rule that "although the absence of a written contract does not by itself grant regular status to the employees, it is evidence that they were informed of the duration and scope of their work and their status as project employees at the start of their engagement. When no other evidence is offered, the absence of employment contracts raises a serious question of whether the employees were sufficiently apprised at the start of their employment of their status as project employees."

In addition, the Court also noted that the company did not submit a report with the DOLE of the termination of respondents' employment every time a project is completed, which is an indication that the workers were not project employees but regular ones.

In view of ECCA's indisputable failure to discharge its burden to prove that respondents were project employees, the Court finds that the CA properly found them to be regular employees. Therefore, respondents, as regular employees, may only be dismissed for just or authorized causes and upon compliance with procedural due process, i.e., notice and hearing. This Court notes that completion of a project is not a valid cause to terminate regular employees, such as respondents herein.

 

Esico v. Alphaland Corp. G.R. No. 216716. November 17, 2021, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

 

Esico v. Alphaland Corp.
G.R. No. 216716. November 17, 2021, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

The rule in illegal dismissal cases that while the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service.

Facts:

The labor dispute between Esico and respondents Alphaland originated from the former employment relationship with PhilWeb Corporation (Phil Web), a part of respondents of companies.

Esico is a well-decorated officer, former pilot Philippine Airforce who retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He is licensed to fly both fixed wing and rotary wing civilian aircrafts and had just topped the Certified Security Professional Examinations at the time of his employment within respondents' group of companies. Given his impressive credentials, Phil Web initially hired Esico as Risk & Security Management Officer (RSMO).

By April 19, 2010, respondents Alphaland concurrently engaged Esico as a rotary wing pilot assigned to fly the Chairperson of respondents' group of companies; Roberto V. Ongpin; to his various engagements within and outside the country.

On even date, Esico sent an e-mail to Alphaland’s then Head of Security and Aviation, Mike Asperin, expressing elation at working for respondents' group of companies and specifically asking for the latter's recommendation on what salary figure to quote respondents for his engagement as Pilot.

In May 2011, along with four (4) other pilots of respondents Alphaland, Esico underwent flight training in the United States of America to operate the brand-new Cessna Grand Caravan 208B purchased by respondents Alphaland for the resort development of its affiliate and subsidiary, Alphaland Balesin Island Resort. The costs of the Cessna flight training amounted to P657,019.00 broken down as follows: (a) course fees of US$11,300.00; (b) airfare of P120,937.00; (c) terminal fee of P750.00; (d) per diem of US$801.00; (d) clothing allowance of US$200.00; and (e) accommodations of 25,562.00.

On December 23, 2011, Esico found out that he had been transferred from Phil web to Alphaland because he could not access his payroll with Phil web. This was confirmed by Philweb's Human Resource Administrator. The latter told Esico that he had been transferred to Alphaland effective December 1, 2011.

On March 3, 2012, Esico was handed a letter from respondents.  The said letter, among others provides that Alphaland agrees to advance the necessary expenses to send him for the ground and flight training course, and such, Esico further agreed render service to the Company for a minimum period of five years beginning on the start date indicated above. And that should he fail to complete the minimum years of service, Esico is subjected to reimburse the Respondent for the expenses spent on his training.

On July 3, 2012, Esico tendered his letter of resignation addressed to [respondents Alphaland’s] HR Manager. In his resignation Letter, he stated the following reasons: (a) serious embarrassments and insults had been committed against his person, honor and reputation on several occasions by a company officer; (b) serious flight safety concerns; ( c) absence of employment contract with Alphaland Corporation; (d) absence of helicopter recurrent training; (e) unresolved issues on services already rendered in favor of Alphaland Corporation as fixed wing pilot from May 2, 2011 to June 2012; and (f) other related matter.

On July 16.  2012, Esico received a demand letter from Alphaland's legal officer. Among other things, the letter demanded that Esico reimburse the amount of P977,720.00 representing the portion of his flight training expenses.

Esico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. He also sent a reply letter addressed to respondents' counsel refuting the allegations therein.  On August 2, 2012, Alphaland filed a complaint against Esico for alleged wrongful resignation and damages with the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Alphaland in and all the acts enumerated by Esico which led him to resign did not amount to constructive dismissal, NLRC declared that Esico was illegally constructively dismissed from his employment. The CA annulled the NLRC decision.

Issues:

1.     Does the Labor Arbiter or NLRC have jurisdiction over the case?

2.     Whether Esico was constructively dismissed

Ruling:

1. No. The LA and the NLRC do not have jurisdiction over the said case.

In this case, the bone of contention between the parties lies in the interpretation of the employment contract, specifically the clause on the minimum service requirement in consideration of expenses (advances) for flight trainings. Unarguably, respondents Alphaland claim payment of actual damages equivalent to the amount they advanced for Esico's flight training who reneged on his contractual obligation by his premature resignation. Respondents Alphaland's cause of action, the supposed violation of the right-duty correlative between the parties, hinges on the enforceability of the contentious clause in the employment contract. Clearly, respondents' recourse against Esico is based on our law on contracts.

Respondents Alphaland's claim against Esico, albeit arising out of their employer-employee relationships, is not cognizable by the LA and the NLRC. Moreover, in determining which tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, we consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but more so the nature of the question that is the subject of controversy.

Alpha land seek to enforce their rights under the employment contract consider ring Esico's failure to comply with his contractual obligation when he resigned from respondent corporations. The 2010 letter engaging Esico as pilot states that in the event of his resignation before completion of the required minimum service, Esico is obliged to reimburse the costs of his flight trainings pro-rated to the number of years already served. Failure to comply with either of the alternative obligations resulted in respondents Alphaland 's cause of action against Esico, which suit is cognizable by the regular courts of law.  Labor tribunals do not have jurisdiction to settle various issues necessitating application of our civil law on obligations and contracts.

Overall, jurisdiction being set by law and not by the parties, the LA and the NLRC cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents Alphaland' complaint just by the mere expedient of the designation thereof as one for "wrongful resignation with claims of damages" and the employer-employee relationship between the parties.

2. No. Esico failed to establish his constructive dismissal by substantial evidence.

From his resignation letter and the evidence threshed out before the labor tribunals and the CA, we are hard pressed to make a finding that Esico' s resignation was involuntary brought about by unbearable, unreasonable, and discriminatory acts of respondents Alphaland. Apart from the employment contract which is the pith of the issue between the parties, Esico did not muster the standard of substantial evidence to prove that respondents Alphaland intended his dismissal. What is fairly apparent is that Esico resigned because he was dissatisfied and unhappy with respondents Alphaland for the cited reasons in his resignation letter.

Considering that Esico was not constructively dismissed, he is not entitled to backwages, and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Court, however, ruled that Esico is entitled to his other money claims of unpaid salaries for his concurrent designation as RMSO and pilot of respondents' group of companies pursuant to the contentious employment contracts.

The arrangement set up by respondents Alphaland, reflected in the ambiguous employment contracts, worked for Esico's disadvantage who was given the run around by respondents each time he attempted to ascertain the true nature of the terms and conditions of his employment. Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances, to prevent injustice, as well as the evasion of an existing obligation, we recompute Esico's unpaid salaries under the various contracts he signed with respondents' group of companies.

Constantino v. Aransazo, Jr. A.C. No. 9701, February 10, 2021, Third Division, (Hernando, J.)

 

Constantino v. Aransazo, Jr.

A.C. No. 9701, February 10, 2021, Third Division, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violating the lawyer's oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR, for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.

Facts:

Sometime in March 2003, Atty. Constantino engaged the services of Atty. Aransazo as counsel in Civil Case entitled "Hope Claire Aldaba vs. Eduardo Tongco, Atty. Constantino, Atty. Aransazo, Jr." for the Annulment of Extra-Judicial Proceedings. The case involved a house and lot registered in the name of Hope Claire Aldaba (Aldaba) who previously obtained a loan in the amount of P1,500,000.00 from Eduardo Tongco.

As security for the loan, Aldaba executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the property and a Promissory Note and Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney in favor of Tongco. As Aldaba failed to pay the amount of the loan on maturity date, Tongco executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Atty. Constantino and Atty. Aransazo, for a consideration, ceding all his rights and interests under the Real Estate Mortgage, Promissory Note and Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney. When Aldaba failed to redeem the property despite oral and written demand, Attys. Constantino and Aransazo filed the abovementioned Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings.

Notably, during the pre-trial in Civil Case, the counsel of Aldaba manifested before the RTC that Atty. Aransazo executed a sworn statement. Complainant insisted that Atty. Aransazo violated Canons 17 and 21 of the CPR, and Rule 138, Sections 20 (e) and 27 of the Rules of Court for disclosing matters confided during the course of a lawyer-client relationship.

In a Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.

The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), in its Resolution reversed and set aside the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and recommended that Atty. Aransazo be "suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months on the ground that [he] breached confidentiality in violation of the rule on conflict of interest."

 

Issue:  Whether Atty. Aransazo, Jr. violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

Ruling: YES.  The Court adopts the findings of the OBC and accepts its recommendation with modification as to the period of suspension.

At the moment Atty. Constantino approached Atty. Aransazo to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the personal relationship between Atty. Constantino and Atty. Aransazo. At this point, the relationship between them imposed upon Atty. Aransazo certain restrictions circumscribed by the profession. In this regard, Canon 17 of the CPR states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." Having ascertained the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Constantino and Atty. Aransazo, it is beyond cavil that the latter is enjoined to keep inviolate confidential and privileged information acquired or revealed during legal consultations.

Atty. Aransazo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he executed the subject sworn statement

The information regarding the real estate mortgage, private documents such as the Deed of Assignment, and other pertinent facts and figures revealed in confidence to Atty. Aransazo used as basis or support in the execution of his sworn statement and the filing of the amended complaint of Aldaba against Atty. Constantino, were all acquired through an attorney-­client relationship. Such act is in direct violation of the CPR and constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to warrant imposition of disciplinary sanction against Atty. Aransazo.

Atty. Aransazo represented conflicting interests in violation of the CPR.

Atty. Aransazo represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR which provides that "a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

WHEREFORE, for violating Canons 15, 17, and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Nemesio A. Aransazo, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Dap-og v. Mendez A.C. No. 12017, October 14, 2020, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

 

Doctrine:

The very point of having a justice system based on the rule of law is to avoid situations such as what happened in this case; every man is presumed innocent and deserves a day in court.
             Thus, the Court cannot countenance respondent's pugilistic behavior and brand of vigilante "justice," as it is this Court's duty to uphold the rule of law and not the rule of men. Respondent, being a lawyer and an officer of the court, should know this basic principle and should have acted accordingly.

Facts:

On February 12, 2014, Roger was at the compound of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) XI, Bangkal, Davao City, to accompany his brother Ruben B. Dap-og (Ruben) to attend a hearing/conference in a case. Protestants therein were represented by Atty. Mendez while Atty. Lilibeth O. Ladaga (Atty. Ladaga) was Gemma's counsel.

Roger then shook hands with Atty. Mendez. However, he was surprised when Atty. Mendez suddenly called him a demon. He then demanded an explanation from Atty. Mendez. Instead of answering, Atty. Mendez, who was sitting then, stood up from where he was seated and tried to grab Roger from across the table. Roger managed to move back but Atty. Mendez still managed to scratch his neck. Atty. Mendez then slapped Roger's left cheek.

Roger tried to move away but respondent, together with Rodolfo and several others, pursued him and managed to land some punches on him. Roger's companion, Jimmy Dela Peña (Jimmy) eventually succeeded in disengaging Roger from Atty. Mendez but not before the latter hit Roger's right shoulder.8 During the commotion, the group of Atty. Mendez was hurling invectives and accusations at Roger.

Roger suffered bruises for several days and his right shoulder was fractured. He also felt humiliated and psychologically tormented after the incident. He averred that he is now constantly in fear and anxious for his personal safety due to the death threats hurled at him by respondent's group.

Consequently, Roger filed a complaint for Less Serious Physical Injuries, Grave Slander and Grave Threat against Atty. Mendez before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Davao City.

Atty. Mendez denied Roger's allegedly malicious accusations against him.

On May 7, 2014, Roger filed the instant complaint with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP Board of Governors (BOG), in Resolution, recommended penalty of the penalty of suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Mendez should be held administratively liable based on the allegations on the Complaint.

Ruling:

YES.  The Court affirms the findings of the IBP and adopt the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Instead of procuring evidence to rebut Roger's evidence, such as the alleged Closed Circuit Television footage mentioned by respondent but never submitted, the latter merely enumerated his supposed achievements that he himself admitted being irrelevant to the instant case. We must remind respondent that this Court applies the law based on the ultimate facts culled from the evidence presented by both parties, regardless of the parties' perceived achievements. In fact, a stricter and more rigid standard of conduct must be observed by lawyers, such as respondent, given that the legal profession is innately imbued with the duty to administer justice.

The case of Soriano v. Dizon reiterates the purpose of disbarment proceedings in relation to the protection of administration of justice, to wit:

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable — lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. x x x.

Moreover, we have ruled that "the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, whether in his profession or private life because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege."

As applied in this case, Atty. Mendez clearly did not meet the lofty standards reposed on lawyers. There is no excuse for respondent's unlawful and dishonorable behavior. Even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent's allegations against Roger were true, that the latter swindled the former's clients, no person should take the law into his own hands. In this regard, this Court must remind respondent that while he can represent his clients with zeal, he must do so within the bounds of the law.