Talabis v. People G.R. No. 214647, March 04, 2020, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

 

Talabis v. People

G.R. No. 214647, March 04, 2020, SECOND DIVISION, (Hernando, J.)

Doctrine:

               Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC for the penalties to be imposed on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting, and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.

Facts:

Leonora Edoc and Rhoda E. Bay-An filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint against petitioner and Arsebino before the Office of Provincial Prosecutor of La Trinidad, Benguet. After preliminary investigation, petitioner and Arsebino were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of PD 705 in an Information.

The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered separate pleas of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After trial on the merits, the RTC found petitioner and Arsebino guilty as charged.

Petitioner, in his Brief, although not raised as an assignment of error, discussed for the consideration of the CA that since the offended party under PD 705 is the government, the complaint against petitioner and Arsebino should have been filed by a DENR official, and not by Leonora and Rhoda who are merely private individuals.
Thereafter, the CA, in its Decision, affirmed the Judgment of the RTC with modifications

Issues:

(1) Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case even though it was based on a complaint filed by Leonora and Rhoda, who are private individuals, and not by a DENR forest officer; and

(2) Whether petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of old age and of voluntary surrender.

Ruling:

1. Yes.  The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case.

Section 80 of PD 705 contemplates two instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for violations of PD 705. The first instance, on one hand, contemplates a situation where a forest officer arrests without a warrant any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in PD 705. On the other hand, the second instance contemplates a situation where an offense described in PD 705 is not committed in the presence of the forest officer and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint.

In both cases, the forest officer shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary information in court.

In other words, Section 80 of PD 705 contemplates situations where acts in violation of the law were committed in the presence of forest officers, or when reports or complaints of violations of PD 705, albeit not committed in their presence, are brought to the attention of forest officers by other forest officers or any deputized officers or officials. In such cases, PD 705 specifically recognizes the special authority of forest officers to file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases after said forest officer has conducted a warrantless arrest, seizure or confiscation of property, or after his receipt of a complaint of report of violations of PD 705, as the case may be.

All told, Section 89 of PD 705 should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations and file criminal complaints regarding offenses described in PD 705. Rather, said provision should be construed as a recognition and reinforcement of their special authority to conduct warrantless arrests, seize and confiscate property, and proceeding therefrom, file the necessary complaints against forestry law offenders.

2. No. Petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration of the January 16, 2014 Decision of the CA where, for the first time, he brought to the attention of the CA the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and old age for the purpose of modifying and imposing the proper penalty against him. As his motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner now imputes fault on the CA for not appreciating the two mitigating circumstances in his favor.

The CA was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the belatedly raised issue of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

"For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present, to wit: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture."

Thus, if such mitigating circumstance was considered by the CA, or this Court for that matter, the prosecution would be denied due process as it would have been denied the opportunity to present evidence to disprove that petitioner did surrender spontaneously and voluntarily to the authorities.

In any event, issues raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel. Failure to assert issues and arguments "within a reasonable time" warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.

Accordingly, the supposed failure on the part of the CA to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in petitioner's favor cannot now be raised as an assignment of error in the present petition.

The Court, however, is aware that herein petitioner is 83 years old as of date as evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Buguias, Benguet. While petitioner could have likewise alleged his advanced age before the RTC, this Court, for equitable and humanitarian considerations, cannot simply ignore and disregard the same for the sole purpose of determining the proper penalty to be meted out against him.

Owing to petitioner's advanced age, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period pursuant to Article 64(2) of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the "minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense" or prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or anywhere between 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months, while the maximum penalty shall be fixed anywhere between 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period.