Obviously,
therefore, Section 28-A merely gives the conservator power to revoke contracts
that are, under existing law, deemed to be defective — i.e., void, voidable,
unenforceable or rescissible. Hence, the conservator merely takes the place of
a bank's board of directors. What the said board cannot do — such as
repudiating a contract validly entered into under the doctrine of implied
authority — the conservator cannot do either. Ineluctably, his power is not
unilateral and he cannot simply repudiate valid obligations of the Bank. His
authority would be only to bring court actions to assail such contracts — as he
has already done so in the instant case. A contrary understanding of the law
would simply not be permitted by the Constitution. Neither by common sense. To
rule otherwise would be to enable a failing bank to become solvent, at the
expense of third parties, by simply getting the conservator to unilaterally
revoke all previous dealings which had one way or another or come to be
considered unfavorable to the Bank, yielding nothing to perfected contractual
rights nor vested interests of the third parties who had dealt with the Bank.
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