The Court
reminded us that the constitutional prohibition under consideration has for its
purpose the preservation of patrimony of the nation.
In the
examination of Section 25 of Republic Act 337, specifically paragraphs (c) and
(d), the Court found that case before them does not fall under anyone of them.
Paragraph (c) of Section 25 of Republic Act 337 allows commercial banks to
purchase and hold properties conveyed to it in satisfaction of “debts”
previously contracted “in the course of its dealings”.
In this case,
such property was not conveyed in satisfaction of a debt from the business’s
ordinary course, but due to a “civil liability” arising from the criminal
offense of qualified theft. Likewise, paragraph (d) of Section 25 of Republic
Act 337 is not applicable.
The Court held
that in no sense that the transfer in questions can be considered a sale made
by virtue of judgement, decree, mortgage, or trust deed. In the same manner, it
cannot be said that the property in questions was purchased by appellants to
secure debts due to it, considering that the term debt employed in the
provisions of the law can logically refer only to such debts as may become
payable to appellant bank as a result of a banking transaction. Conclusively,
it is not the Court’s duty to determine the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the
Constitution. It is only their sworn duty to enforce it free from
qualifications and distinctions that tend to render futile the constitutional
intent.
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